Salt Lake Center (ZLC) reverted back to the HOST computer system last night due to major problems after starting an ERAM run last week that was supposed to be permanent.
I’m sure the FAA and the contractor Lockheed Martin will write it off as just another “glitch” (i.e. part of the development cycle), but it’s another glaring demonstration of how unreliable the ERAM software still is, even though the FAA continues to test it on live traffic, expecting air traffic controllers to simply work around its many problems and keep aircraft safely separated nonetheless.
ZLC started running ERAM on what was supposed to be a permanent basis on the morning of Wednesday, February 17.
They had previously completed an an …
Since the incident with Northwest Flight 188 in October, the FAA has been on the hot seat for failing to recognize and take action in a timely manner on flights that lose radio contact with air traffic control (NORDO, an acronym for “no radio”).
In that incident, FAA managers had plenty of time to act but instead failed to follow procedures that would have notified the military of the flight’s NORDO status.
Considering the amount of time the flight went without being in contact with air traffic control, it was a highly suspicious situation.
According the FAA orders, flights that are out of contact with air traffic for more than five minutes are supposed to be considered …
I hate to be continually blogging about my annoyances with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but my employer just keeps coming up with more stuff noteworthy of mention here, and it’s also my way of venting my frustration.
First, I will establish a little background for those not in the air traffic business so that my story will make more sense.
Air traffic control is highly compartmentalized. That is, the system is built around the concept that a single controller is responsible for, and can freely control traffic only within his own clearly defined section of airspace. Entering another controller’s section of airspace requires permission, as does performing some control action on an aircraft before it is within the confines …
One of the things that’s so frustrating about working as an air traffic controller for the FAA is the organization we work for.
The job itself can be very satisfying: that is if you like the job and you’re any good at it. Air traffic control can be demanding and includes a lot of responsibility as well as work autonomy; controllers work independently with only general supervision almost exclusively.
But a lot of those who don’t like doing air traffic control or weren’t good at it apply to become FAA managers. It’s the Peter Principle at work. And therein lies a large part of what ails the FAA.
There aren’t a lot of prerequisite skills in order to qualify to …
Everyone makes mistakes. But it’s intolerable to see a situation where FAA managers don’t “practice what they preach” or worse yet believe they are above the standards they set for everyone else. After all these are the people that are supposed to be leading the organization. In the case of Northwest 188 they certainly didn’t lead by example.
The situation with Northwest 188 not being in contact with air traffic control snowballed in large part because of the failure of a few FAA managers to follow procedures.
Keep in mind these are the same FAA managers who mandate procedures and checklists for air traffic controllers. These are the same managers who mandate that all verbal air traffic exchanges, as well …
The pilots of the Northwest flight that weren’t paying attention and overflew their destination on October 21st are now claiming that the air traffic controllers are ultimately at fault for the incident because they:
“…did not comply with the requirements of the air traffic control manual and other relevant orders, rules, procedures, policies and practices with respect to Northwest Flight 188, nor coordinate effectively with Northwest dispatch, and such failure was a causal or contributing factor in the incident”
This claim was made in an appeal to the FAA, who revoked their licenses (pilot certificates) as a result of the incident.
The pilots are clearly grasping at straws in this appeal and who can blame them? Without flight …
Recently the incident on October 21st where the Northwest Flight 188 overflew its destination airport (Minneapolis) while its flight crew were apparently using their laptop computers was in the news again.
Shortly after the incident the FAA was faulted for failing to notify the military in a timely manner about the problem with the flight so military fighter jets never got airborne to intercept the plane. (My emphasis)
In a statement to The Wall Street Journal Wednesday evening, FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said air-traffic controllers “should have notified [the military] more quickly that the plane was not responding.” Local controllers apparently became so focused on trying to re-establish contact that they failed to alert higher-level FAA managers about the problem
I just had another long talk with my FAA supervisor that once again highlighted how little the FAA is committed to safety and improving the air traffic system.
We started talking about some relatively new procedures that have resulted in a lot of confusion and resulting operational errors and deviations (air traffic system errors). An operational error is when two or more airplanes get too close, and a deviation is when an aircraft enters another controller’s protected airspace illegally.
The air traffic system has a lot of potential for human error (it’s a fact that there are human beings in the system making critical decisions and human beings make mistakes). However, the redundancy built into the system (usually) is intended …
Last Wednesday evening a Northwest Airbus 320 jet airliner from San Diego to Minneapolis (Flight NWA188) went for over an hour without talking to air traffic controllers (NORDO) and subsequently overflew its destination by 150 miles before its pilots became aware.
(This is the second big newsworthy incident for Northwest airlines: in 1990 a Northwest crew flew a B727 jet carrying 91 passengers from Fargo to Minneapolis while intoxicated.)
Initial reports said that the flight was out of radio contact for over 75 minutes, but the FAA letters revoking both pilots’ licenses said that they had been out of contact for 91 minutes.
For a few days immediately afterwards it was a mystery as to what the …
Air traffic controllers for the Federal Aviation Administration have been working under imposed work rules since Labor Day of 2006 after failing to come to a contract agreement.
This year the Obama Administration forced the FAA and the air traffic controllers’ union, NATCA, back to the bargaining table to resolve the dispute. The contract articles they were unable to agree upon were eventually sent to a panel of arbitrators, who made their decision regarding those items.
(This isn’t really new news, and some other websites have already discussed these issues, but I figured I’d add my two cents as well…)
Here is the introduction from that decision in August of 2009 (including my highlighted sections):
OPINION OF THE PANEL